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All In, But Left Out: How the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
Seeks to Eradicate Online Gambling
in the United States
ABSTRACT
In recent years, gambling on the Internet has evolved into a
multi-billion dollar enterprise. The industry has been particularly
entrenched in the United States, whose citizens at one time accounted
for up to one-half of all Internet gambling revenues. However, the
landscape of Internet gambling in the United States changed
drastically in 2006, when President George W Bush signed into law
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA). The
crucial provision of the UIGEA is its prohibition of the acceptance of
payments, made by United States banks and creditors, to purveyors of
unlawful Internet gambling enterprises. By targeting United States
financial institutions instead of individual gamblers, the UIGEA
attempts to indirectly prohibit Internet gambling within U.S. borders.
The UIGEA, however, is not without both legal and pragmatic
problems. This Note seeks to illustrate those problems and to predict
how the UIGEA will continue to affect the Internet gambling industry.
First, the Note provides a background of prior attempts at regulation of
Internet gambling, both at the state and federal level. Second, it
engages in a textual analysis of the UIGEA, recognizing potential legal
arguments both for and against the law. Third, the Note touches on
how the UIGEA has affected an ongoing trade dispute between the
United States and Antigua and Barbuda. Finally, the Note recognizes
potential enforcement problems raised by the UIGEA, even if all of its
provisions are legally sound.
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On October 13, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into
law the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (the
UIGEA, or the Act).1 The Act, principally sponsored by Senator Jon
Kyl and House Representatives James Leach and Robert Goodlatte,
prohibits online gambling enterprises' acceptance of payments from
banks and creditors in the United States.2 Additionally, the Act
authorizes the entities that regulate U.S. financial institutions-the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board-to
promulgate regulations by which the financial institutions must
comply. 3 The legal implications of the UIGEA are changing daily.
In recent years, the popularity of gambling in the United
States has exploded. 4  Poker, blackjack, and sports wagering-
1. Heather Timmons & Eric Pfanner, U.S. Law Causing Turmoil in Online
Gambling Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at C3. See generally Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C.A §§ 5361-67 (West Supp. 2007).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. 31 U.S.C. § 5364 (2000).
4. See AM. GAMING ASS'N, 2007 STATE OF THE STATES: THE AGA SURVEY OF
CASINO ENTERTAINMENT 2 (2007), available at http://www.americangaming.org/assets/
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activities once carried out only in "brick and mortar" casinos-can now
all be played on the Internet. 5 The explosion of Internet gambling was
due, in large part, to the remarkable ease with which players could
participate. Initially, a player simply deposited funds electronically,
via debit card or other intermediate electronic payment system. 6 After
setting up an account and making a deposit, a player was ready to
gamble. 7  There were no smoke-filled casinos and no cocktail
waitresses; instead, the same high stakes were available in the
comfort of one's own home.
Despite the huge popularity of Internet gambling within the
United States, almost all Internet gambling websites are incorporated
outside of the country.8 As such, U.S. regulation of those companies
has been next to impossible, and U.S. citizens have essentially been
free to gamble online to their hearts' content. Congress,
characterizing Internet gambling as a pervasive national problem, felt
action needed to be taken before the problem spiraled out of control.9
Enter the UIGEA. In a tactical maneuver, perhaps made to
limit debate on the subject, Congress passed the Act as part of the
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (the SAFE Port
Act). 10 Congress's earlier attempt at anti-gambling legislation in 2000
failed, for a variety of reasons discussed in this note.11 By attaching
the UIGEA as a rider on the SAFE Port Act, Congress would not be
denied the opportunity to pass the gambling legislation it had so
vehemently worked to enact for the past decade. Regardless of the
tactics or motivations of Congress, the UIGEA is now on the books.
files/aga_2007_sos.pdf (noting that, in 2006, gross gaming revenues for the U.S.
commercial casino industry totaled $32.42 billion).
5. See, e.g., Wild Jack Gaming, http://www.wildjack.com/blackjack.php (online
blackjack casino) (last visited Oct. 22, 2007); Sports Interaction,
http://sportsinteraction.com/sportsbook/index.cfm (online sports book) (last visited Oct. 22,
2007).
6. See, e.g., "How to Deposit Money into an Online Poker Account,"
http://www.thepokerbank.com/making-a-deposit.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
7. See id. ("[Tihis process is very simple and took me less than a minute to
complete.").
8. See H.R. REP. No. 109-522, pt. 1, at 6 (2006) (citation omitted).
9. See id. at 10 ("Because of the uniquely interstate and international nature of
the Internet, [legislation] is necessary, and provides the States and the Federal
government with the tools needed to reduce the prevalence of Internet gambling-while
providing additional tools to enforce these prohibitions.").
10. Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, §§
801-03, 120 Stat. 1884, 1952-61.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 109-522, pt. 1, at 6 (recognizing that state governments
typically regulate gambling).
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This Note will first give a brief history of gambling laws in the
United States prior to the UIGEA. Much of the gambling legislation
in the U.S. is a matter of state law; as such, this Note will briefly
address some of the Internet-specific gambling laws of several states.
It will also discuss the purported enforcement problems state
attorneys general have encountered in enforcing Internet gambling
laws--one of the chief reasons cited by Congress as demonstrating the
need for federal Internet gambling legislation.
This Note will also address other federal laws enacted prior to
the UIGEA that purported to address Internet gambling. The United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) has consistently cited one law in
particular-the Wire Act of 1961-as the principal authority that
makes Internet gambling illegal in the United States. Next, this Note
will examine one of the high-profile enforcement actions the United
States has taken against an Internet gambling company under the
Wire Act. This Note will then analyze the role the Wire Act has under
the UIGEA.
The Note will also address the potential implications the
UIGEA has on the United States' free-trade policies. The U.S. is
currently waging a battle in front of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) against an unlikely adversary-the tiny country of Antigua
and Barbuda. 12  Many Internet gambling companies are
headquartered in the island country-the smallest WTO member-
and thus, will take a tremendous loss if U.S. customers are removed
from its market. This Note, without delving deeply into trade law or
policies, will address the potential problems a recent WTO ruling
might have on the viability of the UIGEA.
The bulk of this Note, however, will be devoted to a textual
analysis to the UIGEA. Many of the Act's definitions are incredibly
ambiguous, which raises questions as to the Act's scope. As a result,
several prominent Internet gambling websites have chosen to fight the
Act and remain in the U.S. market. This Note will examine in detail
the viability of the legal arguments these sites have raised and predict
how a court might rule if faced with the issue.
Finally, this Note will account for the potential enforcement
problems raised by the Act, and how gamblers may, perhaps legally,
subvert the government's mission of eliminating online gambling in
the U.S. As new developments surrounding the UIGEA are arising
12. Antigua Seeks EU Support on WTO Case Against US Online Gambling Laws,
POKERPAGES, Feb. 11, 2007, http://www.pokerpages.com/poker-news/news/antigua-seeks-
eu-support-on-wto-case-against-us-online-gambling-laws--29524.htm.
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daily, this Note will attempt to predict future developments related to
the Act.
I. BACKGROUND
Internet gambling has taken its foothold in the United States
as one of the fastest-growing and most popular pastimes of web
surfers. In particular, sites featuring poker games have enjoyed
tremendous success. 13 ESPN's telecast of the World Series of Poker,
the widespread advertising for poker sites on television, and the ease
with which players can sign-up and play online contributed
significantly to the boom of online gambling. 14 In the last few years,
online gaming has peaked:
Gambling on the Internet has become an extremely lucrative business. In recent
years, industry revenue and the number of gambling websites have risen
dramatically. In 1997, Internet gambling industry revenues were estimated to be
$445 million; in 2001 those estimates grew to $1.6 billion a year. Internet
gambling is now estimated to be a $12 billion industry, with approximately $6
billion coming from bettors based in the United States. It has been reported that
there are as many as 2,300 gambling sites, offering everything from sports betting
to blackjack and poker. Most of these virtual casinos are organized and operated
from off-shore locations, where the websites operate free from both State and
Federal interference.
15
While polls show that only four percent of Americans gamble online,
this number nonetheless represents a figure much larger than merely
two years ago.
16
In fact, seventy percent of online gamblers admit they began
playing within the last two years. 17 Perhaps reflective of a largely
web-based culture, a great percentage of online gamblers have been
found to be very active on the Internet, using it as a tool to conduct
13. See Wikipedia, Online Poker, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online-poker (citing
the value of ParadisePoker.com to be $340 million in 2004, and the initial public offering of
Party Gaming, the parent company of PartyPoker, to have exceeded $8 billion in 2005) (last
visited Oct. 22, 2007).
14. Much of this spike in popularity of online poker can be traced to the success of
Chris Moneymaker, an accountant-turned-professional player who won the World Series of
Poker in 2003. Chris Moneymaker Biography, http://www.chrismoneymaker.com/pokerbio
(last visited Sept. 26, 2007). Moneymaker had earned the $10,000 entry fee to the World
Series by winning a qualifying "satellite" tournament on the poker site PokerStars.com. Id.
15. H.R. REP. NO. 109-552, pt. 1, at 6.
16. AM. GAMING ASS'N, 2006 STATE OF THE STATES: THE AGA SURVEY OF CASINO
ENTERTAINMENT 21 (2006), available at http://www.americangaming.org/assets/files/
2006_Survey-forWeb.pdf.
17. Id. at 24.
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their daily activities.18 Gambling on the Internet has become an
international phenomenon that showed no signs of stopping in the
United States-until the enactment of the UIGEA.
A. Pre-UIGEA State Regulation of Online Gambling in the United
States
States have customarily regulated gambling under the purview
of the Tenth Amendment. 19 In fact, several states have expressly
prohibited Internet gambling, including Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
and Nevada. 20 Other states have taken aggressive steps to prosecute
Internet gambling sites, even absent express statutory prohibition. 21
In enacting the UIGEA, Congress explicitly stated that it did
not intend to alter states' power to regulate online gambling. 22
Rather, Congress cited the enforcement problem facing state attorneys
general in their attempts to prevent Internet gambling as a chief
reason for enacting the UIGEA.23 Attempts by attorneys general to
prosecute Internet gambling under the ambit of consumer fraud laws
have met widespread frustration. 24 State attorneys general report
that "citizens are often unaware that gambling on the Internet is
illegal, even if those same persons are aware that their State of
residence does not allow gaming."25 Additionally, Florida claims that
it cannot regulate Internet gambling because of the sprawling nature
of the Internet. Thus, the Florida attorney general opined that "any
18. Id. (noting that most online gamblers are "Internet savvy" individuals, many of
whom also use the Internet to manage their bank accounts, get directions, and purchase
airline tickets).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."); James D. Thayer, Note, The Trade of Cross-Border Gambling and
Betting: The WTO Dispute Between Antigua and the United States, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 13, 10, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf2004DLTROO13.pdf.
20. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-5-2
(LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 465.093(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2001).
21. See Scott Olson, Betting No End to Internet Gambling, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 2,
paras. 13-16 (1999) (detailing charges for deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and
consumer fraud brought by Minnesota against an internet gambling business).
22. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5361(b) (West Supp. 2007) ("No provision of this subchapter
shall be construed as altering, limiting, or extending any . . .State law . . .prohibiting,
permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.").
23. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-552, pt. 1, at 7 (2006).
24. Id.; see also Olson, supra note 21, at paras. 14-16 (outlining the Attorney
General of Minnesota's efforts to prosecute internet gambling websites).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 109-552, pt. 1, at 7 (citing H.R. REP. No. 107-591, pt. 1, at 6
(2002)).
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effort to regulate use of the Internet is better suited to federal
regulation than to patchwork attention by the individual states." 
26
B. Pre- UIGEA Federal Regulation of Gambling in the United States:
The Wire Act and its Progeny
The frustration expressed by state attorneys general fueled, at
least in part, the enactment of the UIGEA. Although gambling
typically is a state-regulated activity, federal interest in regulating
gambling has "long been concerned with the prevention of organized
crime and with assisting the states to enforce their own laws."
27
Consistent with this purpose, the Federal law that opponents of
Internet gambling most commonly cite is the Wire Act of 1961 (the
Wire Act).
28
The Wire Act prohibits anyone "engaged in the business of
betting or wagering" from utilizing a "wire communication facility" to
place "bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest."29  As one
commentator notes, "the Wire Act, like all other federal statutes prior
to the UIGEA, makes no express mention of Internet gambling."
30
The DOJ has a "long-standing position that under the Wire Act
of 1961 'betting and wagering businesses that transmit bets or wagers
on sporting events or contests over the Internet' are breaking the
law." 31  Accordingly, some courts have held that Congress did not
intend the Wire Act to apply to individual bettors, but rather to larger
bookmaking operations. 32 Moreover, the "sporting event or contest"
26. Olson, supra note 21, at para. 17 (quoting Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. No. 95-70 (Oct.
18, 1995)).
27. Thayer, supra note 19, at 10.
28. Olson, supra note 21, at para. 18; see 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
29. Olson, supra note 21, at para. 18 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a)). A "wire
communication facility" is defined as:
[A]ny and all instrumentalities, personnel, and services (among other things, the
receipt, forwarding, or delivery of communications) used or useful in the
transmission of writings, signs, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire,
cable, or other like connection between the points of origin and reception of such
transmission.
18 U.S.C. § 1081 (2000). Thus, "since the Internet involves the transfer of pictures over the
phone or cable lines, it would be deemed a 'wire communication facility' under the statute."
Olson, supra note 21, at para. 18 n.71.
30. See Olson, supra note 21, at paras. 18-19.
31. Thayer, supra note 19, at 10 (quoting Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of
1999. Hearing on H.R. 3125 Before the Subcomm. On Telecommunications, Trade and
Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 36 (2000) (statement of
Kevin V. Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.)).
32. See United States v. Tomeo, 459 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1972) ("The [Wire Act]
deals with bookmakers-persons 'engaged in the business of betting or wagering."'); accord
2007]
222 VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:1:217
language seems to limit the Act's application to betting on sports or
games; other generalized betting, such as lotteries, seemingly would
not fall under the purview of the Act. 33 Additionally, legislative
history strongly indicates that the purpose of the Wire Act was to
"prohibit bookmaking on sports."34
Therefore, it is unclear whether the Wire Act would even
provide an enforcement mechanism against online gambling.35 The
DOJ has indicated that there is "some confusion as to whether the
Wire Act applies only to sports betting, and that Congress should,
therefore, amend the law to explicitly cover all forms of betting and
gambling."36  Moreover, other federal laws that are related to
gambling activities generally provide little guidance in the regulation
of Internet gambling. 37 Consequently, Congress decided it needed
another arrow in the quiver for the fight against Internet gambling.
38
C. The First (Failed) Attempt at Legislation: The Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act
The UIGEA was not Congress's first attempt at expanding the
scope of federal power to restrict online gambling. In 1997, Senator
Jon Kyl and House Representative Robert Goodlatte introduced bills
to "amend the Wire Act to clarify that Internet gambling is included as
an illegal communication activity, unless allowed by individual
United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.R.I. 1981) ("Congress intended the
business of gambling to mean bookmaking, i.e., the taking and laying off of bets, and not
mere betting.").
33. Olson, supra note 21, at para. 18.
34. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 87-967 (1961)) (stating that the purpose of the Wire
Act was to "aid in the suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting the use of
wire communication facilities" (emphasis added)).
35. See Thayer, supra note 19, at 10.
36. Id. (citing Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3125
Before the Subcomm. On Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H.
Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 36 (2000) (statement of Kevin V. Di Gregory, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen.)).
37. See Olson, supra note 21, at para. 19; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)-(b) (2000)
(disallowing use of "any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to ... further
any unlawful activity," including "any business enterprise involving gambling"); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955(b)(1) (2000) (criminalizing the actions of five or more persons who enter into an
illegal gambling business for a continuous period of time); 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2000)
(prohibiting a person from gambling "on one or more competitive games in which amateur
or professional athletes participate").
38. See H.R. REP. No. 109-412, pt. 1, at 2 (2006) ("New mechanisms for enforcing
gambling laws on the Internet are necessary because traditional law enforcement
mechanisms are often inadequate for enforcing gambling prohibitions or regulations on the
Internet, especially where such gambling crosses State or national borders.").
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states."39 The resultant law was to be called the Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act (the IGPA).
40
The IGPA sought to amend the Wire Act, given the latter's
purported lack of mechanisms tailored specifically to combat Internet
gambling.41 As discussed above, one of the limitations of the Wire Act
is that it makes no mention of the Internet and is seemingly restricted
to sports bookmaking. 42 The IGPA sought to rectify this and other
limitations, prohibiting "any person engaged in a gambling business
knowingly to use the Internet or any other interactive computer
service to place, receive, or otherwise make a bet or wager."
43
Furthermore, the IGPA defined the phrase "bets or wagers" as the
"risking of anything of value (besides a de minimis amount), with the
understanding that a person will receive something of value based on
an outcome which is predominantly subject to pure chance." 44 The
IGPA seemingly purported to expand the scope of federal regulation to
all games of chance on the Internet; consequently, online casinos and
poker rooms would thus fall under the purview of the IGPA.
45
Despite apparent bicameral, bipartisan support, the IGPA
officially died in the House in 2000.46 Allegedly responsible for the
failure in the House was none other than Jack Abramoff.47 At the
time, Abramoff represented an online lottery site that stood to go out
of business if the IGPA passed.48  "Amid [Abramoffs] frenzied
lobbying, a potentially influential letter . . . began circulating on
39. Olson, supra note 21, at para. 20; see Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of
1997, S. 474, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S2560 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Kyl); accord H.R. 2380, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. E1633 (1997) (daily ed. Sept. 3,
1997) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
40. See S. REP. No. 106-121, at 1 (1999). There was a second Senate version of the
IGPA in 1999, even though the 1997 version had passed the Senate "by a unanimous poll,"
because "the House did not complete action on the legislation due to the lateness of the
session" in 1997. Id.
41. See id. at 10.
42. See supra Part I.B.
43. S. 692, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 26,
1999).
44. Olson, supra note 21, at para. 21 (citing S. 474, 105th Cong. § 2 (as reported by
Senate)).
45. For a discussion of the relevance of the similar "games of chance" provision in
the UIGEA, see infra Part II.A.1..
46. See Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, How a Lobbyist Stacked the Deck,
WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2005, at A01.
47. See id. Abramoff is the former Washington lobbyist who pleaded guilty in 2006
to a variety of federal conspiracy and wire fraud charges related to the funding of casinos.
Walter P. Roche & Richard B. Schmitt, Lobbyist Guilty in Plea Deal; Abramoff to Help
Bribery Probe in Congress, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2006, at 1.
48. Schmidt & Grimaldi, supra note 46, at A01.
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Capitol Hill. It was purportedly signed by [Florida Governor] Jeb
Bush."49 The letter allegedly stated: "While I am no fan of gambling, I
see this bill as a violation of states' rights and I am looking to prevent
this encroachment. 5 °
Though the letter was exposed as a forgery, it still had a
profound impact on the House vote.51 Congressman Goodlatte, one
sponsor of the IGPA, "became worried that amendments might be
introduced during the debate that could kill the bill. '52 He then placed
the bill on the House suspension calendar, usually reserved for non-
controversial bills that do not generate much debate.53 Nevertheless,
several House members abstained from voting on the bill and enough
voted against it in order to bring about its defeat. 54 When all was
concluded, the first attempted federal measure purporting to regulate
Internet gambling had failed.
D. The Cohen Crack-Down: Early Days of Enforcement
With the failure to pass the IGPA, the federal government's
most publicized crackdown on Internet gambling implicated the Wire
Act. In 1998, well before the online gambling boom had reached the
U.S., federal authorities arrested Jay Cohen, a young American
businessman, for operating a gambling company out of the island
country of Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua).55 Cohen's company, the
World Sports Exchange (WSE), solely involved bookmaking on sports
in the U.S.56 The WSE "required that its new customers first open an
account with WSE and wire at least $300 into that account in
Antigua. A customer seeking to bet would then contact WSE either by
telephone or internet to request a particular bet."
57
Cohen was convicted in federal court of violating the Wire Act
and, in 2001, the Second Circuit upheld Cohen's conviction.58 The
court held that by establishing two forms of wire facilities-internet






54. See id. The bill failed by a 245 to 159 margin. Id.
55. United States. v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2001).
56. Id. at 70.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 71, 78.
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betting information found in the Wire Act.5 9 In so holding, the court
did not distinguish between Cohen's transmission of information by
telephone and transmission by Internet, recognizing that each would
place his conduct within the purview of the Wire Act. 60
Cohen finished serving a seventeen-month prison sentence in
2004.61 Cohen is supposedly the first "foreign-based individual"
operating a gambling business in a country "where gambling is legal
and regulated" to be convicted under the Wire Act. 62 Interestingly
enough, WSE never ceased operations while Cohen was tried,
convicted, or serving his prison sentence.63 In fact, Cohen could have
avoided prosecution altogether had he remained in Antigua; his
original business partners remain on the island and still operate
WSE. 64 In any event, Cohen's case was the first highly-publicized
action by the U.S. against an online gambling operation.
E. Antigua Takes on the United States in Front of the WTO
Antigua, the tiny island country in which Cohen lived and
operated WSE, has become a haven for online gambling operations.
By 1997, more than twenty Internet gambling businesses had taken
root in Antigua. 65  Two years later, after Antigua's government
instituted a licensing program, 3,000 people were employed by
Antigua's gambling and betting industry.66 At that point, Antigua
was home to 119 licensed Internet gambling and betting operations. 67
Also by the same year, the government of Antigua was receiving more
59. Id. at 76; see 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000) (prohibiting use of "a wire
communication facility for the transmission . . .of bets or wagers or information assisting
in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of
a wire communication") (emphasis added).
60. See id. ("We need not guess whether the provisions of § 1084 apply to Cohen's
conduct because it is clear that they do.").




64. See Ed Koch, 'Net Gaming Operator Cohen Freed from Prison, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Mar. 23, 2004, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/sun2004/mar/23/
516573962.html.
65. Thayer, supra note 19, at 4 (citing First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, 28, WT[DS285 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.antigua-
barbuda.com/business-politics/pdf/Antigua-FirstSubmission.pdf).
66. Id. (citing First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 65, at 30).
67. Id.
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than $7.4 million dollars each year in licensing fees, which made up
more than ten percent of the nation's gross domestic product. 68
Understandably, Antigua had reason to panic when Cohen was
decided. Any U.S. restrictions on offshore online gambling
operations-or their operators, as in Cohen-certainly posed a threat
to the island. Viewing the U.S. policy as a threat to its economy and
free trade, Antigua requested that a WTO panel be established to hear
its grievances against the U.S.69 This Note will briefly analyze the
WTO's most recent ruling and the potential implications it might have
on the UIGEA, but will not discuss international trade law on a more
detailed level.
II. ANALYSIS
As with any statutory legal analysis, the text of the statute is
the beginning point. As such, this Note will first analyze in detail
what the UIGEA actually prohibits. The textual analysis will start by
analyzing the key terms as provided in the definitions section of the
Act. As part of the textual analysis, this Note will examine the
legislative history, purpose, and other driving forces behind the
UIGEA. As the analysis will demonstrate, the critical terms employed
in the Act will inevitably give rise to ambiguities and potential
enforcement problems.
Following the textual analysis, this section will shift to
potential diplomatic and trade problems raised by the UIGEA. As
stated above, the Act could potentially have substantial free-trade
implications for the U.S. 70 Moreover, given that many of the affected
gambling sites are based outside of the U.S., there is a possibility of
non-compliance or non-reciprocity. Finally, this part will predict the
potential enforcement problems associated with the Act.
A. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
Section 5363 of the UIGEA begins: "No person engaged in the
business of betting or wagering may knowingly accept, in connection
with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet
gambling . . . (1) credit . . . (2) an electronic fund transfer . . .(3) any
check . . .or similar instrument .. .or (4) the proceeds of any other
68. Id.
69. First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 65, at 22; see also infra
Part II.A.4 (discussing in detail these trade developments).
70. See supra Part I.E.
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form of financial transaction . *."..,71 On its face, the Act seeks to
prohibit the acceptance of payment used to fund all types of unlawful
Internet gambling. However, several questions arise regarding
definitions within the Act. First of all, what constitutes a person
"engaged in the business of betting or wagering"? That is, what is a
"bet" or a "wager"? Moreover, what is "unlawful" Internet gambling?
The UIGEA fails to give precise definitions for these terms; as such,
analysis of the terms necessarily implicates sources outside the Act.
1. Is Poker a Game "Subject to Chance"?
The first clause of § 5363 addresses persons "engaged in the
business of betting or wagering."72 The Act defines a "bet or wager" as
"the staking or risking by any person of something of value upon the
outcome of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject to
chance. '73  The "contest" and "sporting event" elements of the
definition clearly purport to prohibit acceptance of payment by
businesses engaged in sports betting. However, the "game subject to
chance" part of the definition gives rise to great ambiguity and debate
because the Act does not define what a "game subject to chance"
actually is. If poker is a game subject to chance under the Act,
Internet poker sites will be "engaged in the business of betting or
wagering." 74 Conversely, if, under the Act, poker is not a game subject
to chance but rather a game of skill, then Internet poker sites will not
be "engaged in the business of betting or wagering. ' 75 Thus, whether
poker is a "game subject to chance" is a critical threshold
determination as to whether Internet poker sites fall within the
auspices of the UIGEA.
Nowhere does the Act explicitly mention poker or an attempt to
regulate poker. Additionally, the legislative history of H.R. 4777, one
of the House precursors to the Act, contemplated the illegality of
conducting a lottery over the Internet, yet made no explicit mention of
any game, including poker, as being a "game subject to chance." 76
71. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5363(1)-(4) (West Supp. 2007).
72. Id. § 5363.
73. Id. § 5362(1)(A) (emphasis added).
74. See id. § 5363.
75. See id. This conclusion is based on the assumption that Internet poker sites are
not also maintaining other gambling operations, such as sports wagering, that would fall
within the "contest of others" or "sporting event" categories of "bet or wager" found in §
5362(1)(A) section of the Act. If that were the case, whether poker is a game subject to
chance would be moot, and the site would be engaged in the business of betting or wagering
regardless.
76. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-552, pt. 1, at 13 (2006).
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Robert Goodlatte, the Republican senator who sponsored H.R. 4777,
stated that H.R. 4777's purpose was "to make it clear that the
prohibitions [in the Wire Act] include Internet gambling and the use of
other new technologies." 77 However, this proposed amendment to the
Wire Act was omitted from the UIGEA as enacted.
78
One industry giant has recognized the potential poker loophole
in the UIGEA. PokerStars.com, the world's second-largest Internet
gambling company, has staunchly maintained that poker is a game of
skill, not a game of chance.79 Since the passage of the UIGEA in
October 2006, PokerStars.com is one of the few poker sites that has
continued to solicit and accommodate its U.S. customers.8 0
PokerStars.com notified its subscribers by e-mail stating,
"PokerStars.com has received extensive expert advice from within and
outside the US, which concluded that these provisions do not alter the
US legal situation with respect to online poker."81
Because the Act does not define a "game subject to chance," a
court would have to look outside the statute itself to make such a
determination. As articulated above, gambling has traditionally been
a state-governed activity.8 2 According to a substantial body of state
cases, the test for whether a game is one of chance or one of skill is
"not whether it contains an element of chance or an element of skill,
but which of these is the dominating element that determines the
result of the game."8 3 Under this dominating element test, there is
77. Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Weekly Report: Putting a Stop to Internet Gambling (Feb.
17, 2006), http://www.house.gov/goodlatte/weekly-report_2004_2006/021706.html.
78. The House merged H.R. 4777, sponsored by Rep. Goodlatte, and H.R. 4411,
sponsored by Rep. Leach, after the bills were reported out of the House Financial Services
and the House Judiciary Committees. See H.R. REP. 109-412, pt.1 (2006); H.R. REP. 109-
412, pt.2 (2006); H.R. REP. 109-552, pt. 1 (2006).
79. Tali Tsipori, PokerStars' Stars Still Shine, ISR. Bus. ARENA, Oct. 19, 2006.
PokerStars.com, however, is not the only online gambling company to maintain this
position. Cal Spears, president of poker site PocketFives.com, has stated, "Online poker is
a game of skill, not a game of chance. It needs to be treated as such rather than placed in
the same breath as online blackjack and craps." News in Brief about the Gaming World:
House of Representatives Passes Bill that Would Outlaw Online Gambling, 10 GAMING L.
REV. 341, 341 (2006). FullTiltPoker.com, another website still trying to do business with
U.S. customers, stated: "As poker is a game of skill rather than pure chance, we hope that
it will not be affected by" the UIGEA. Posting of FullTiltPoker to FullTiltPoker Blog,
http://www.fulltiltpoker.com/poker.blog/2006/10 (Oct. 2, 2006).
80. Cf. Tsipori, supra note 79 (noting that the CEO of PartyGaming.com said
PokerStars.com, its top competitor, was "very brave ... to think that [it was] not going to
be next to be indicted, arrested, and pursued").
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
83. Indoor Recreation Enters., Inc. v. Douglas, 235 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Neb. 1975)
(emphasis added); accord Morrow v. State, 511 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1973); Longstreth v.
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great uncertainty as to where poker would fall on the chance-skill
spectrum. It is indisputable that poker, by its very nature, involves a
certain degree of luck: players are dealt cards and place bets based on,
at least in some respect, the expectation of a favorable subsequent
card. However, as the name of the "dominating element" test implies,
what matters is whether the luck involved in poker predominates over
any other skill that allows one player to prevail over another on a
consistent basis, or vice-versa.
8 4
There are strong arguments that skill predominates over luck
in a poker game. Professor Christine Hurt has advanced an argument
comparing poker to blackjack, characterizing poker as the far more
"skilled" game:
Arguably, the game of poker requires more skill than the game of blackjack. In
blackjack, the size of the wager is determined at the beginning of the game, and so
the return is predetermined. In poker, the amount of the wager increases during
the game, and part of the skill is not only knowing when to continue playing and
when to fold, but how much to continue betting when not folding. The expected
return of a poker hand changes not only with the dealt hand and the other cards
played, but also with the size of the pot. Poker is played against other players, not
against the house, so a great deal of skill is involved in reading the other players,
bluffing, and not revealing one's strategy.
8 5
Professor Hurt's analysis illustrates important traits of poker that
heavily implicate skill. That poker is played against human
opponents, for instance, weighs heavily in favor of poker as a game of
skill.8 6 In blackjack, players compete not against each other but
against the "house" (the dealer, acting on behalf of the casino).87 The
house must receive another card ("hit") or refrain from doing so
("stay") based on predetermined rules.88 As such, a blackjack player
typically chooses whether to hit or stay based on what the dealer is
Cook, 220 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Ark. 1949); In re Allen, 377 P.2d 280, 281 (Cal. 1962); Steely v.
Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 977, 978 (Ky. 1942); Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359
P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961); State v. Ricciardi, 114 A.2d 257, 258-59 (N.J. 1955); People ex rel.
Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 755 (N.Y. 1904); Progress Vending, Inc. v. Dep't of Liquor
Control, 394 N.E.2d 324, 328-29 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); D'Orio v. Startup Candy Co., 266 P.
1037, 1038 (Utah 1928); State v. Hahn, 586 N.W.2d 5, 10-11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
84. Cf. Morrow, 511 P.2d at 129-30 (noting that "[s]kill or the competitors' efforts
must sufficiently govern the result" for something to be a game of skill).
85. Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online
Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371,
382 (2006) (citation omitted).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Blackjack: Rules of the Game, http://www.blackjackinfo.com/blackjack-
rules.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) (noting that generally a dealer must continue to take
cards until his total is seventeen or greater).
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showing, as compared to the player's own cards.8 9 Thus, the principal
skill of a blackjack player is determining whether to hit or stay in a
given situation. After the player makes that determination, she is
reduced to the role of hoping the cards fall her way.
Conversely, as Professor Hurt indicates, poker involves far
more complicated strategies than does blackjack. The fundamental
difference between the two games is that in poker, often the best hand
does not win. For example, player A may place a large bet in order to
get player B to fold his hand, even though, perhaps to the supposition
of A, B is holding better cards. Likewise, B might recognize A's bluff,
and "call" him on it (match the bet). Absent any knowledge of the
opponent's cards, such determinations are necessarily based in large
part on non-chance factors, such as the ability to read another person's
bluffs or recognize his strategy. In poker terminology, these indicators
are referred to as "tells."90
Nonetheless, despite the skill necessary to make such plays,
luck often plays a substantial role in poker. Suppose, in the situation
above, player B calls player A's bet at a point where each player will
be dealt two more cards; even if B has a ninety percent probability of
winning the hand at this point, A can still defeat B if A draws cards
that make his hand better than B's. In that example, B correctly
surmised that his cards were better than A's, yet he still ended up
losing. The converse of this argument is that the law of probability
will nonetheless render B the winner ninety percent of the time. A's
lucky draw is the exception, not the rule. One critic explained the role
of luck in poker:
Let's take a good player. No, let's take a great player. Make him the greatest
hold'em player who ever lived. Suppose his chances are 10 times greater than those
of Joe Average, even though the chasm between great and average is probably not
anywhere near that deep. With that kind of edge, our hero figures to win a 3,000-
player event once every 300 times. If he has a 60-year poker-playing career, he
ought to win the World Series of Poker once every five lifetimes. An average player,
by comparison, figures to win all the marbles only once in 50 lifetimes.
9 1
89. See generally id. (discussing a player's options, such as hitting, standing, or
splitting).
90. See Play Winning Poker, Top Ten Poker Tells,
http://www.playwinningpoker.com/articles/03/10.html (recognizing such cues as trembling
hands, wavering voice, body posture, and chip stacking as indicators of a player's hand)
(last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
91. Lou Krieger, Three Hundred is a Long Time, CARD PLAYER MAG., Dec. 17, 2004,
available at http://www.cardplayer.com/magazine/article/14415.
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This theory explains why some poker players will experience greater
success than others over time.
92
However, many of the "human" factors that make poker a game
of skill are eliminated when the game is played on the Internet.
Players are obviously not face-to-face, so detection of physical or
psychological tells is impossible. Conversely, online players still may
determine how to bet or what cards to play based on another player's
non-psychological tendencies. For example, a player may bet the same
amount when he has a good hand; an experienced player can pick up
on such a tendency, regardless of whether the game is played in
person or on the Internet. Also, a player can still calculate the odds of
a certain card falling his way in an online game. Thus, many of the
strategies and tactics that suggest poker is a game of skill remain
intact during online play. Nonetheless, poker clearly takes on a
different character when played on the Internet; by eliminating
physical and psychological factors, online play removes much of the
skill involved in an in-person game.
Most states have adopted the dominating element test, or some
variation of it, in determining whether poker is a game of skill or one
of chance. 93 Given the relatively sound arguments on both sides, it is
unsurprising that states are thus far split on the issue. 94 Recently, a
court in England addressed the issue and found poker to be a game of
chance. 95 Derek Kelly, the proprietor of a poker game at a private
club, was found to have violated a licensing requirement for operators
92. Id. But see Chuck Humphrey, Is Poker in the U.S. a Game of Skill?, GAMBLING
L. U.S., http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Articles-Notes/online-poker-skill.htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2007) (stating that while certain skills play a large role in successful poker play,
they "just do not outweigh the elements of chance caused by the fall of the cards and the
erratic, unpredictable play of a large number of opponents").
93. See Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games People Play: Is it Time for
a New Legal Approach to Prize Games?, 4 NEV. L.J. 197, 202 (2003) (observing that most
states have adopted a "predominance test," under which poker falls into a "gray area" of
luck and skill).
94. Id. Compare Charnes v. Cent. City Opera House Ass'n, 773 P.2d 546, 551 (Colo.
1989) (en banc) (holding that poker is a form of gambling under Colorado law, despite some
elements of skill), and United States v. Marder, 48 F.3d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding
a jury verdict that chance predominated over skill in video poker games as reasonable
under Massachusetts law), with Commonwealth v. Club Caravan, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 405, 406
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (affirming ruling that video poker machines "involved as a matter of
law an element of skill" and qualified for licensure as "automatic amusement devices"), and
Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 93-5 (Apr. 21, 1993) (opining that poker is a game of skill under
Colorado law).
95. See Man Guilty in Poker Skills Case, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/uk-news/england/london/6267603.stm (noting that the jury took
less than two hours to reject the argument that poker was a game of skill).
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of "games of chance."96 The English court rejected Kelly's argument
that poker was a game of skill, which would have precluded him from
needing a license to host the gamey
7
If a U.S. court were to adopt the generalized holding of the
English court from Kelly's case-that poker is a game of chance-such a
result would be highly problematic for the likes of PokerStars.com.
However, Kelly's case appears to represent a much narrower fact
scenario, and can be distinguished from a potential case arising under
the UIGEA. England's 1968 Gambling Act, under which Kelly was
prosecuted, "states that games with any element of chance, even a
minority, are considered games of chance under the statutes."98 Given
the preponderance of the dominating element test in U.S. courts, it is
unlikely a U.S. court would adopt a holding as strict as that of the
English court in Kelly's case. 99
Given the great uncertainty regarding whether poker is a game
of skill or chance, it is likely that a dispute centering on the issue will
reach a federal court. Of all the courts that have applied the
dominating element test, it appears none has addressed the specific
issue of Internet gambling. At the federal level, this will be an issue of
first impression. If a court were to rule that poker is a game of skill,
and thus, not a game "subject to chance," then sites such as
PokerStars.com would have free reign to continue business operations
with U.S. customers.
Such a decision would have monumental implications and
could frustrate Congress's purpose in enacting the Act. 00 However, if
Congress had wanted to define poker as a "game subject to chance,"
thus establishing that poker websites are "engaged in the business of
betting or wagering," it could have done so. Had Congress done this,
companies like PokerStars.com still could have argued that poker was
a game of skill. However, persuading a court to overturn an explicit
textual mandate of Congress is a far tougher battle than persuading a
court to adopt a particular line of reasoning absent such a mandate.
For that reason, in addition to the arguments advanced above, it is
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Amy Calistri, Analysis: The UK Skill vs. Chance Case and the UIGEA,
POKERNEWS, Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.pokernews.com/news/2007/1/uk-skill-vs-chance-
uigea.htm (emphasis added).
99. See id. The prosecutor in the Kelly case, Graham Trembath, told the jury that,
"once these cards are shuffled, then you have introduced an element . . . of chance." Id.
(alteration in original).
100. See H.R. REP. No. 109-552, pt. 1, at 5 (noting that H.R. 4777 aims to prohibit
both "traditional forms of gambling such as online poker" and the "transmission of
electronic funds ... to pay for gambling bets").
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entirely plausible that a court adopting the dominating element test
would rule in favor of online gambling companies.
2. Section 5363(2): Intermediate Payment Systems
Section 5362(2) of the UIGEA prohibits acceptance of "an
electronic fund transfer, or funds transmitted by or through a money
transmitting business, or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or
money transmitting service."'101 Thus, in addition to prohibiting direct
acceptance of credit and checks for unlawful Internet gambling, the
Act prohibits acceptance of funds through an intermediate payment
business. 102
Without a doubt, § 5363(2) is one of the most potentially
devastating provisions of the Act for online poker sites. In 2001, Visa
created a special code that prohibited its cards from being used for
online gambling.103 Other card companies followed suit soon
thereafter.104 Since 2002, using a credit card simply has not been a
viable way to gamble on the Internet.'0 5  As such, § 5363(1),
prohibiting the acceptance of credit from someone gambling on the
Internet, has little practical import.
After realizing that they could essentially no longer use credit
cards to fund their Internet gambling accounts, online gamblers had
to turn elsewhere to place funds into online gambling sites.
Responding to that reality, Internet gambling operators began to
encourage the use of PayPal, an intermediate payment system, as a
101. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5363(2) (West Supp. 2007).
102. Id. §§ 5363(1), 5363(3), 5363(2).
103. I. Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006 Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537, 539 (2006).
104. See Joanna Glasner, EBay Says No to PayPal Gambling, WIRED, July 9, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/newsfbusiness/0,1367,53703,00.html ("Many large credit card
issuers, such as Bank of America, Fleet, Direct Merchants Bank, MBNA, and Chase
Manhattan Bank have already started to block online gaming transactions. More recently,
Citibank, which controls approximately 12 percent of the U.S. credit card industry, also
joined in."). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf
(examining the relationship between U.S. credit card companies and the online gaming
industry).
105. This fact casts considerable doubt on Congress's finding that "Internet
Gambling is a growing cause of debt collection problems for . . . the consumer credit
industry." See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5361(a)(3); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
104, at 25 (reporting that, around 2002, "requests for credit card payments [by Internet
casino operators were] denied").
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means to deposit funds.106  Although PayPal initially agreed to
partake in such transactions, it stopped doing so in 2002.107
After PayPal's departure from the online gambling scene,
online gamblers had to find an alternative means of payment yet
again. This demand coincided with the exploding growth of Neteller,
another intermediate payment system. By early 2007, Neteller had
grown into one of "the largest independent online money transfer
business[es] in the world with 3 million customers in 160 countries
and over $7 billion in annual transactions."'108 Poker players funding
online accounts generated the majority of Neteller's business.10 9
Neteller and other similar services would very likely be termed
"money transmitting businesses" as listed in § 5363(2) of the
UIGEA.110 Section 5365 of the Act authorizes state attorneys general
to seek a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction
against any party engaging in a restricted transaction.1 As such,
any acceptance of payment by or through Neteller would be
prohibited.1 2  However, despite the Act's fairly straightforward
prohibition of Neteller's business in the context of online gambling,
there are substantial enforcement problems. Neteller is incorporated
in the Isle of Man, not the U.S. 113 The Isle of Man would be unlikely
106. See Glasner, supra note 104. PayPal describes its service as a "safer, easier way
to pay and get paid online .... [It] allows anyone to pay in any way they prefer, including
through credit cards, bank accounts, buyer credit or account balances, without sharing
financial information." About PayPal, http://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p
/genlabout-outside (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
107. See Glasner, supra note 104. EBay, which acquired PayPal in 2002,
prophetically attributed its decision to end PayPal's involvement with Internet gambling to
an "uncertain regulatory environment surrounding online gaming." Id.
108. Neteller Founders Arrested by FBI, Charged with Money Laundering,
POKERPAGES, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.pokerpages.com/poker-news/news/neteller-
founders-arrested-by-fbi-charged-with-money-laundering-29454.htm.
109. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Charges Two Founders of
Payment Services Company with Laundering Billions of Dollars of Internet Gambling
Proceeds 2 (Jan. 16, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
January07/netellerarrestspr.pdf (noting that, in 2005, ninety-five percent of Neteller's
revenue was "derived from money transfers involving internet gambling companies"); cf.
Neteller Founders Arrested by FBI, supra note 108 (asserting that Neteller's fund services
were used extensively by a majority of online poker players).
110. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5363(2).
111. Id. § 5365. The term "restricted transaction" is defined as "any transaction or
transmittal involving any credit, funds, instrument, or proceeds described in any
paragraph of section 5363 which the recipient is prohibited from accepting under section
5363." Id. § 5362(7).
112. See id. § 5363(2).
113. NETELLER PLC, ANNUAL PRESS RELEASE 16 (2004), available at
http://investors.neteller.com/neteller/upload/NLR_2004_AnnualRelease2.pdf.
ALL IN, BUT LEFT OUT
to enforce a temporary restraining order. 114 A preliminary injunction
would be equally ineffective because they are typically "issued without
a full trial and can be modified at any time by the trial judge."11 5
Under the Act, the U.S. government's best option at preventing
Neteller from staying in the online gambling business is likely just to
hope gambling sites stop accepting payments from them.
Perhaps it was this fear that led the government to pursue
options outside the Act in order to bring down Neteller. On January
15, 2007, the DOJ arrested Neteller's founders in connection with "the
creation and operation of an [I]nternet payment services company that
facilitated the transfer of billions of dollars of illegal gambling
proceeds from United States citizens to the owners of various
[I]nternet gambling companies located overseas." 116  The DOJ
recognized that the arrests were "part of [its] effort to combat
unlawful [I]nternet gambling through, among other things, the
implementation of the federal anti-money laundering statutes."1 17 On
January 17, 2007, as a result of the arrests, Neteller stopped
processing payments related to gambling by U.S. citizens.1
18
3. The UIGEA's Ambiguity: What is "Unlawful Internet Gambling"?
The Neteller arrests were a huge blow to online gambling in
the U.S. The U.S. government effectively eliminated the largest third
party payment processor in the world-without even having to invoke
the UIGEA. After the arrests, the DOJ stated that "[b]oth the
operation of an [I]nternet gambling operation and the transferring of
the proceeds from these businesses overseas are illegal under United
States law."1 19 Unhelpfully, the DOJ did not specify what law made
Internet gambling illegal. Moreover, the UIGEA defined "unlawful
Internet gambling" as only bets or wagers already unlawful under any
"applicable Federal or State law in the State ... in which the bet ... is
114. See Rose, supra note 103, at 540.
115. Id.
116. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 109, at 1.
117. Id. at 3. The Press Release also references the recent "indictments of two
offshore internet gambling companies-Worldwide Telesports, Inc ... and BetonSports,
PLC, a publicly traded holding company that owns a number of Internet sportsbooks and
casinos, and its founder, Gary Stephen Kaplan." Id.
118. Press Release, Neteller Group, Neteller PLC Trading Update (Jan. 18, 2007),
http://www.neteller-group.com/press/en/123.htm ("[T]he Group will cease processing online
transactions related to gambling for the [U.S.] market with effect from today in light of the
passing of the UIGEA and the uncertainties and likely delays relating to the drafting and
implementing of regulations.").
119. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 109, at 2.
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initiated, received, or otherwise made."120 That is, the UIGEA itself
does not specifically render any sort of Internet gambling illegal.
The question arises: What U.S. law makes Internet gambling
illegal or "unlawful"? The government's argument in the Neteller case
relied on Internet gambling being an illegal activity, as would any
other enforcement action under the UIGEA. 121 As noted, the principal
statute relied upon by the DOJ to prosecute Internet gambling is the
Wire Act. 122 However, the text of the Wire Act indicates confinement
to gambling on sports.1 23  Representative Goodlatte's House bill
attempted to expand the scope of the Wire Act to include "traditional
forms of gambling such as online poker," but this was omitted from
the final version of the UIGEA. 124 Congress therefore passed up the
chance to expand the scope of the Wire Act. As a result, it is highly
dubious as to whether federal law even prohibits any form of Internet
gambling in the U.S.
4. Antigua: Scoring a Victory on the International Front
In 2003, Antigua brought a complaint with the WTO regarding
the United States' Internet gambling policies. Antigua alleged that
the U.S. actions against Internet gambling affected the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services.1 25 Antigua also contended
that the cumulative impact of the U.S measures prevented the supply
of gambling and betting services from another WTO Member to the
U.S. on a cross-border basis. 126 According to Antigua, the measures at
issue were inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provision of the WTO, to
which both countries are signatories.
127
The WTO panel found in favor of Antigua on several grounds.
First, the panel held that, among other laws, the Wire Act was
inconsistent with the United States' obligations to provide goods and
120. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(10)(A) (West Supp. 2007).
121. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 109, at 2; see also 31
U.S.C.A. § 5363 (prohibiting the "acceptance of any financial instrument for unlawful
Internet gambling") (emphasis added).
122. See supra text accompanying note 28.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
125. First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 65, at 7 132.
126. Id. at 213; see also id. at It 10-20 (detailing the origins of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services and each party's relationship with the Agreement).
127. Summary of the Dispute to Date, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 28, WT/DS285 (Oct. 1, 2003), available
at http://www.wto.org/englisltratop-e/dispue/cases-e/ds285_e.htm
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services "no less favorable" than those the U.S. afforded to its own
citizens.1 28  Moreover, the panel held that the U.S. failed to
demonstrate that the Wire Act fell under the "public morals" exception
to the GATS, which would have rendered the Act permissive. 29
In April of 2005, the WTO Appellate Body overturned the
findings of the panel in one respect, and upheld it in another very
important respect.1 30 It reversed the panel finding that the U.S. did
not demonstrate that the Wire Act could fall within the "public
morals" exception of Section XIV(a) of the GATS.131 However, it
upheld the panel's finding that the U.S. acted inconsistently with the
"market access" limitations in Section XVI of the GATS. 132
In August 2005, a WTO arbitrator determined that the
reasonable period of time for U.S. implementation of the Appellate
Body's findings was April 2006. 133 In July 2006, after the passage of
the deadline, Antigua requested the establishment of a panel to assess
the United States' potential transgressions, in light of the passage of
the UIGEA.1 3
4
In March 2007, the WTO panel ruled in favor of Antigua once
again. The panel decided that the UIGEA's prohibition on Internet
gambling was illegal because it did not similarly prohibit off-site
betting on horse and dog racing. 135 The UIGEA states that "[t]he term
'unlawful Internet gambling' shall not include any activity that is
allowed under the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978."136 This carve-
out poses a problem under the "market access" limitations of the
GATS. 137 That is, the UIGEA essentially purports to wipe out the








135. US, Antigua Battle Over WTO Sanctions Level for US Online Betting Ban, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/28/business/EU-FIN-
ECO-WTO-US-Online-Gambling.php.
136. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(D)(i) (West Supp. 2007).
137. See First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 65, at 180-81
("With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article I, each
Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less
favourable [sic] than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed
and specified in its Schedule.") Thus, Member countries must afford treatment just as
favorable to other Member countries as it does to its own citizens. Allowing purveyors of
horse racing businesses to sidestep the UIGEA, as the allegation goes, violates the "market
access" limitations.
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companies to offer their services under the Interstate Horseracing
Act. 138
As a result of the WTO panel's March 2007 ruling, Antigua has
requested that the WTO impose $3.4 billion in commercial sanctions
on the U.S.; not surprisingly, the U.S. is vigorously disputing the
fine. 139 However, even in the face of a favorable U.S. ruling on
monetary sanctions, it is unlikely that Antigua can stop the United
States' enforcement of the UIGEA by itself. As one of the WTO's
smallest members, Antigua simply does not have the economic power
to cause the U.S. to comply with the panel's ruling. However, as of the
final draft of this Note, Antigua has solicited aid from the European
Union, which potentially could give economic and political support in
its fight against the UIGEA.140
III. CONCLUSION
In the short time since its passage, the UIGEA has already had
a profound impact on Internet gambling in the U.S. Several of the
industry's giants have removed all business within the U.S, and their
net value has tumbled greatly as a result.141 This includes not only
the poker rooms and casinos that once provided a mechanism for
online gambling, but also the intermediate payment systems that had
allowed players to fund their accounts in the past.142 In several short
months, Internet gambling in the U.S. has made an about-face.
However, any dire predictions that Internet gambling will
disappear altogether from the U.S. are myopic. With respect to the
casual gambler, the UIGEA will probably continue to accomplish its
purpose of eliminating online play. With the exit of Neteller from the
intermediate payment market, the viable options for depositing money
are now very limited. Until another payment processor similar to
138. See Antigua Seeks EU Support, supra note 12; see also Interstate Horseracing
Act of 1978 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (2000) (finding that the policy of the Congress "to regulate
interstate commerce with respect to wagering on horseracing").
139. US, Antigua Battle Over WTO Sanctions Level for US Online Betting Ban,
supra note 135.
140. Id. Mark Mendel, WTO attorney for Antigua, stated that he hopes to meet with
EU Internal Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy soon, to "explore how [Antigua's]
WTO trade dispute case with the US could benefit from expanded EU support." Id.
141. See, e.g., Aaron Todd, Party Poker Mucks U.S. Hand, October 13, 2006,
http://www.casinocitytimes.com/news/article.cfm?contentlD=161766 (commenting on
PartyPoker.com's removal from U.S. market and noting that the site had controlled forty-
one percent of online poker revenues worldwide, of which seventy-seven percent came from
the U.S. in 2005).
142. See supra Part II.A.2.
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PayPal or Neteller steps into the market, there are very few ways for
online gamblers to deposit money into an online gambling account. It
seems that a cash or money order, or holding a foreign bank account,
is the only viable option for depositing money onto an online gambling
site.
As for the hard-core online gambler, however, the UIGEA
provides little more than an inconvenience in his quest to gamble
online. If a player wants to gamble online badly enough, he will
deposit money in a foreign bank. Moreover, because the U.S.
government brought down Neteller under money laundering charges,
not via the UIGEA, it is hard to believe that an imitation company
will not take the chance that the UIGEA does not apply to its
services. 143 The U.S. online gambling market is simply too lucrative
for one company not to take such a chance.
The UIGEA has also indisputably created a mess for the U.S.
on the international front. The latest WTO ruling has, on its face,
dealt a blow to the U.S. with respect to international trade.
Nonetheless, Antigua must solicit substantial aid from the European
Union-or another source-to give it leverage against the U.S. on the
international trade front. Otherwise, the WTO ruling might have
little practical effect.
Despite its ambiguities, potential for enforcement problems,
and potential for trade violations, the UIGEA has already made a
profound impact across the online gambling universe By explicitly
preventing U.S. financial institutions from supplying money to
Internet gambling sites, the UIGEA has handcuffed a great majority
of U.S. participants in Internet gambling. One member of Congress
has taken note of the impact of the UIGEA, and has introduced
legislation that would effectively repeal the UIGEA and its purported
ban on Internet gambling. 144 Nonetheless, as of the final draft of this
143. See supra text accompanying notes 128-130.
144. See News Release of Congressman Barney Frank (April 26, 2007),
http://www.house.gov/frank/netgambling0407.html. Congressman Frank's bill, in addition
to effectively repealing the UIGEA, purports to create "a federal regulatory and
enforcement framework to license companies to accept bets and wagers online from
individuals in the U.S., to the extent permitted by individual states, Indian tribes and
sport leagues." Id.
2007]
240 VANDERBILTJ. OF ENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:1:217
Note, the UIGEA is the law of the land. As such, it remains to be seen
whether the Internet gambling industry can regain its once-strong
foothold in the U.S.
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